Introduction
Social ontology is a budding branch of philosophy, but there has been little con sideration of what exactly social ontology is. 1 Social phenomena include financial transactions, cocktail parties, two people walking together, athletic teams, and leg islatures, among countless other things -a "motley crew," as Margaret Gilbert has called them (1989, p. 441) . Construing ontology as an inventory of what genuinely and nonredundantly exists, do all -or any -social phenomena belong in ontology? And why should anyone care about what is, and is not, in ontology at all? Before answering these questions by offering my own account of social ontol ogy, I want to discuss a different but wellknown account -John Searle's -about which I think I've made a startling discovery. Searle has at least three articles with the words "Social Ontology" in the titles, and he considers his project an attempt to "explain the fundamental nature and mode of existence -what philosophers call the essence and ontology -of human social institutional reality" (Searle 2010, p. ix) . The surprise is that the overall ontology to which Searle is committed excludes his theory of social reality.
John Searle on "Social Ontology"
Searle's question, as he has posed it, is, "What is the ontology of social reality?" (Searle 2007, p. 4) As we shall see, there is a real puzzle about Searle's use of the word "ontology." 2 Searle's view is complex: social and institutional reality depends on what he calls "status functions," that is, functions that human beings confer on physical objects and people by a type of speech act; these func tions, in turn, carry deontic powers -rights, duties, obligations, etc. (Searle 2010, p. 7-9) .
Although I am not going to summarize Searle's view here, the basic puzzle is this: On the one hand, Searle says, [The world] "entirely consists of physical particles in fields of force," and hence is independent of minds (Searle 1995, p. 7) . But on the other hand, he says, "social reality exists only because we think it exists;" it is created by us (Searle 2006 (Searle , p. 13, 2010 . Searle needs to show, then, how an entirely physical ontology can include social phenomena that exist only because we think that they exist.
In Making the Social World, Searle lays down two conditions of adequacy for a theory of social reality. First, "we must not allow ourselves to postulate two worlds or three worlds or anything of the sort. We live in exactly one world" (Searle 2010, p. 3) , and that is "the world described by physics and chemistry" (Searle 2007, p. 4) . 3 The second condition is like unto the first: the theory of social reality must show how nonbasic facts (namely, social facts) are derived from basic facts (namely, facts given by the physical sciences). Indeed, he says that the "basic requirement of our enterprise" is to show how "all the phenomena that we discuss -money, universities, cocktail parties, and income tax are…derived from and dependent on the basic facts" (Searle 2010, p. 4 ).
The term "derive" here is ambiguous. It may be used in such a way that what is derivative does not add anything to the reality already implicit in what it was derived from, or it may be used in such a way that what is derivative does add to the reality that was already there in what it was derived from. Compare logic, where a deductive inference is "explicative," in that it adds nothing to what was already implicitly in the premises, and an inductive inference is "ampliative," in that it adds to what was implicitly in the premises.
Either way that we disambiguate the term "derive" leads to a dilemma for Searle. On the one hand, if social reality does not add anything new to what was already there, then social phenomena have no place in ontology; locating social phenomena in the ontology of such a world would be like adding heat to an onto logy that already contains molecular motion. Doing so would just be redundant. An ontology of physical particles would be complete. But on the other hand, if social phenomena really do add something new to what was already there, then locat ing social phenomena in ontology would imperil Searle's physicalism: the world would not "entirely consist of physical particles." Either way, Searle cannot have both social ontology and a physicalist view of ontology in general.
To put the problem differently, Searle says, "there are at least two different senses of the objective/subjective distinction: an epistemic sense and an ontological sense" (Searle 2010, p. 18 ). Searle explains, "ontological objectivity and subjectivity have to do with the mode of existence of entities. Epistemic objectivity and subjec tivity have to do with the epistemic status of claims" (Searle 2010, p. 18) . In Making the Social World, he formulates the question at issue like this: "How can there be 3 A more complete expression of the idea is this: "We know independently that the world con sists entirely of physical particles in fields of force (or whatever the ultimately correct physics tells us are the final building blocks of matter) and that these physical are organized into systems and that soe of the carbonbased systems have evolved over a period of about 5 billion years into a very large number of animal and plant species, among which we humans are one of the species capable of consciousness and intentionality" (Searle 2006, p. 13). an epistemically objective set of statements about a reality which is ontologically subjective?" His answer, in brief, is that the social world is ontologically subjective in that its existence depends on the attitudes of others, but it is epistemically objective, in that statements about social phenomena are not just matters of opinion, but are knowable independently of the attitudes of others (Searle 2010, p. 18) .
Since ontology concerns existence, not knowledge (Searle 2010, p. 18) , the epistemic objectivity of the social world has no bearing on ontology. On Searle's view, what makes something social is an epistemic matter of our conferring a status on physical phenomena. A cocktail party is a gathering of people that we count as a cocktail party. So, when Searle says that the social world is "ontologically subjec tive," the word "ontologically" is just a façon de parler; in light of Searle's general ontology, what is ontologically subjective has only epistemic import, no ontological significance at all. Otherwise, ontology would not conform to physicalism. Hence, given Searle's conditions of adequacy for a theory of social reality -a theory of social phenomena in a world that is entirely physical -there is logically no place for social phenomena in ontology. Putting social phenomena in ontology would either render the ontology redundant, or would abrogate Searle's physicalism.
A Different Approach to Social Phenomena
On my view, social phenomena do belong in ontology. Although I agree with Searle that we human beings make an essential contribution to the existence of social reality, a crucial difference between Searle and me is that I am a plural ist, not a physicalist. I do not endorse Searle's physicalism, the view that "all that exists in the world are physical particles with their properties and relations" (Searle 1984, p. 26-27) . Let me begin with my overall view of ontology.
General Ontology
Ontology, as I mentioned, is an inventory of reality, of what genuinely exists without redundancy -for example, what objects, properties and kinds there really are. 4 By "reality," I mean to include everything required to make intelligible what we perceive and interact with and what survives our inquiries. 5 Since not all the objects, properties and kinds that exist now have always existed, we can only construct timeindexed ontology -ontology at a time. For something to be in the ontology at t, it must be irreducible to anything else and ineliminable at t. Total ontology, to which we have no access, includes what genuinely exists at any time (including the future).
There are three important features of my conception of the natural world: (i) Primary kinds, (ii) the relation of constitution, and (iii) the existence of intention dependent phenomena. First, primary kinds: For any x, we can ask, what most fundamentally is x? The answer is what I call x's "primary kind." Everything that genuinely exists has a primarykind property -being a horse, being a table, being a passport, being a person. The primarykind property tells what the thing basically is. It has its primarykind property essentially; an object could not exist without its primarykind property. Moreover, primarykind properties are neither eliminable at t nor reducible and hence belong in ontology at t, as do the objects of those primary kinds (such as a horse or a table).
Second, the relation of constitution: Entities are unified by a relation that I call "constitution." As I have argued at length elsewhere (Baker 2000 (Baker , 2007 (Baker , 2013 , constitution is a timeindexed, contingent relation of unity between items of different primary kinds -e.g. between a person and her body at t, between a dollar bill and a piece of paper at t, between a baseball team and its players at t. When, say, a piece of sheepskin is in certain circumstances (diplomafavorable circumstances), it comes to constitute a new object, a diploma. Constitution is thus a vehicle of ontological novelty. If x constitutes y at t, then y's primarykind property confers on y causal powers that the constituter, x, would not have if it had not constituted anything. 6 So, constitution is not identity. Nor is constitution a partwhole relation. If x constitutes y at t, then x cannot be a proper part of y (since y is not identical to x + other part); and x cannot be an improper part of y (since x and y are not identical).
Incidentally, I believe that every concrete object in the natural world is ulti mately constituted by physical particles, but that does not imply that the world "entirely consists of physical particles." As I mentioned, constitution is a vehicle of novelty: it adds new kinds of things to ontology.
Third, intentiondependent phenomena: a significant feature of our world is that it is populated by things -such as pianos, pacemakers, and paycheckswhose existence ontologically depends on the existence of persons with propo sitional attitudes. I call any object that could not exist in a world lacking beings with beliefs, desires and intentions an "intentiondependent object," or an "ID object." 7 ID objects that we are familiar with include kitchen utensils, precision instruments, credit cards and so on. ID properties are properties that cannot be instantiated in a world without beings with beliefs, desires and intentions; and similarly, for ID events and ID phenomena generally. 8 Underlying the idea of ID phenomena is a distinction between mind dependence and mindindependence. Minddependent phenomena ontologically cannot exist or occur in a world without minded entities who have an array of attitudes (like believing, desiring, intending); mindindependent phenomena can exist or occur in a world that has no such minded entities. Social phenomena of all sorts are ID phenomena and thus mind dependent.
Minddependent objects are not necessarily subjective. A baseball diamond is an ID object but is not subjective, either ontologically or epistemically. Thus, my mindindependent/minddependent distinction is not equivalent either to Searle's ontological objective/subjective distinction or to his epistemic objective/ subjective distinction. 9 A crucial difference between physicalists and me is that on my view, minddependent phenomena may be just as genuine or as "real" as mind independent phenomena. Many (perhaps all) physicalists take mind independent phenomena to be ontologically superior to minddependent phenomena.
I disagree: Temporally prior, yes; but we should not confuse temporal with ontological priority. An entity x is ontologically prior to y only if x has greater ontological significance than y. Mindindependence does not confer ontological significance. (This seems obvious if you think of the time right after the Big Bang: the entities and properties that existed then presumably were mind independent, but not more ontologically significant than artworks and artefacts that exist today. Artefacts -say, robots-could not exist in a world without minds, but they 7 Gary Matthews suggested the term "ID phenomena" for phenomena whose occurrence or exist ence depends on there being entities with propositional attitudes. 8 A large variety of phenomena are ID phenomena. For example, the event of writing a check is an ID event, because there would be no such thing as writing a check in a world lacking the social and economic conventions that presuppose that people have beliefs, desires and intentions. (Writing a check is a fundamentally different kind of phenomenon from moving one's hand, and still more different from one's hand's moving.) Most human activities are ID phenomena -both individual (getting a job, going out to dinner, designing a house) and collective (manufacturing automobiles, changing the government, etc.). They could not exist or occur in a world without beliefs, desires, and intentions. 9 Indeed, I believe that Searle's notion of ontological subjectivity is confused. Sometimes he says that what is ontologically subjective "exist[s] only as experienced by human or animal subjects". His examples are tickles and pains. But at other times, he says that "observerrelativity implies ontological subjectivity" (Searle 2006, p. 15) , and he takes screwdrivers to be observerrelative since they depend on the attitudes of the makers and users (Searle 1995, p. 10) . Hence, he must take screwdrivers to be ontologically subjective. But screwdrivers (like other social (ID) objects) exist when they are not being experienced. have no less ontological significance than the atoms and gases that existed in the first minute after the Big Bang.) 10 To sum up: General ontology concerns nonredundant reality -what genuinely exists, (at a time), what is irreducible and ineliminable then. The universal rela tion that lowerlevel entities bear to the entities that they make up is c onstitution -a relation of unity that is not identity. Every constituted thing is of some primary kind or other, where a primarykind property identifies the essence of the thing, what it is most fundamentally. The fact that some primary kinds (artefacts, art works) are intentiondependent in no way diminishes their ontological status.
Social Ontology
General ontology has a number of subfields, domainspecific or regional ontolo gies (ElderVass 2010, p. 68). Social ontology is such a domainspecific subfield, which should include the basic entities, properties and kinds studied by the social sciences. 11 There are two kinds of social entities: social individuals and social complexes or collectives.
I'll say that a property is social if and only if its instantiation requires that there exist communities of creatures with attitudes (like believing. desiring, and intending). I have no theory of communities except to say broadly that they are pluralities of individuals considered collectively who have something in common -perhaps intentional (e.g. by sharing the same aim or goal), but perhaps not (e.g. by being recruits in an army).
A word about social individuals before moving to our main topic, social com plexes. Social individuals that have social primarykind properties belong in the social ontology. Human persons are social individuals who have social primary kind properties -namely, firstperson perspectives -in virtue of which they are persons. Although many nonhuman animals have rudimentary firstperson 10 My view here is somewhat idiosyncratic. Most philosophers who recognize ontological levels privilege the lower levels (e.g. the level of physical particles) over the higher levels (e.g. the level of complex machines, or organisms). I think that (nonreductive) emergence gives rise to the opposite assessment. Indeed, in my opinion, the more items that are "fundamental" (irreducible and ineliminable), the richer the reality. My approach is the opposite of Jonathan Schaffer's in "What Not to Multiply Without Necessity." His meta ontology fits exactly his Spinozistic onto logy that there is only one substance, and it is fundamental. I suppose that my metaontological opinion fits my massively pluralistic ontology. 11 More specifically, social ontology includes irreducible and ineliminable (at a time) social prop erties (i.e. properties whose exemplifications require the existence of social communities), enti ties of social primary kinds (i.e. entities whose primary kind properties are social properties) and social primary kinds (i.e. kinds whose existence requires the existence of social communities). perspectives (i.e. consciousness and intentionality), only persons have robust firstperson perspectives made possible by complex natural language. The evolu tion of human persons parallels the evolution of natural language, and natural language requires the existence of linguistic communities, which are paradigms of social communities. I've spelled this out elsewhere (in Baker 2013 Baker , p. 126-143, 2015 . Human persons are in the ontology in virtue of having firstperson perspec tives as their primarykind property.
The focus here is not on social individuals, but social complexes, for example, institutions -legislatures, universities, teams, armies, nations, and so on. These complexes are constituted by aggregates of legislators, provosts, professors, players, soldiers, citizens, etc. On my view, the aggregate of individuals who make up a social complex at t constitutes it at that time. All constituents of a social complex have at least a rudimentary firstperson perspective -i.e. consciousness and intentionality.
A social complex may be constituted by different aggregates of individuals at different times. The baseball team gets a new pitcher; the firstbaseman is traded to another team. But at each moment that the baseball team exists, there is an aggregate of individuals that constitutes the team at that time.
Constitution is a complicated relation that not only requires a constituter (whether an individual or an aggregate), but also requires that the constituter be in certain circumstances, different circumstances for different kinds of social complex. Let "S" stand in for a social entity (individual or complex), I'll use the term "Sfavorable circumstances" for the different kinds of circumstances in which a social entity S comes to be constituted. The Sfavorable circumstances are analogous to Searle's constitutive rules (or rather to the rules' antecedents if the rules are expressed as conditionals). Here are some examples:
When what is constituted is a social individual, its immediate constituter is a single individual object: For example, a driver's license is constituted by a piece of plastic; a piece of plastic constitutes a driver's license only in driver'slicense favorable circumstances that include being issued by the Department of Motor Vehicles, having printed on it a picture of, and information about, the driver. (I think that Searle's supposition that you typically start with a physical thing and then declare it to have a status function is too simple; the piece of plastic itself is brought into existence in order to constitute a driver's license, and driver's licenses are interwoven into a whole way of life.) But when what is constituted is a social complex, its constituter at t is an aggregate.
The electorate is constituted at t by the aggregate of eligible voters at t. The differ ences among different social complexes -say, a baseball team and a nationstateshow up in the different Sfavorable circumstances for aggregates to constitute them. My point here is that there are different Sfavorable circumstances for citizenship in the US than for membership on a baseball team. All the differences in social entities (individual or complex), I believe, can be accommodated in this way, by differences in Sfavorable circumstances for the constitution of different social entities. 12 Institutions may be of social primary kinds, and hence belong in ontology. Like other primarykind properties, social primarykind properties are irreducible and (at a time) ineliminable; they also have the following two features: (i) they can be instantiated only by social entities, and (ii) their instantiation requires the existence of social communities -think of the properties of being married, of being employed, of being elected to office, of being an owner of property. In these cases, social communities show up in the Sfavorable circumstances (e.g. laws and conventions conferring rights and duties) of marriage, employment, elec tion, and propertyownership. Different institutions are distinguished from one another by having different Sfavorable circumstances.
For example, a university, I think, has a primarykind property of engaging in advanced teaching and research. It is constituted by fluctuating aggregates of stu dents, professors, administrators and so on, but it cannot be reduced to individu als in the aggregate that constitute it at any time. The Sfavorable circumstances in which an aggregate constitutes a university include qualifying for different roles -administrators, professors at various ranks, counselors, staff, students. Social complexes, as entities, have causal powers that the individuals who make them up do not have, either singly or collectively. For example, a university confers degrees. Whoever hands you the diploma does not confer the degree; he or she only acts as the authorized representative of the university. The degree is conferred by the uni versity.
[Other examples: In the US, Congress declares war, not members of Con gress or of the Administration. Armies have battle plans, not individual soldiers.]
Consider a different example: marriage is an irreducible social and legal institution; so, marriage and its primarykind property, being married, belong in the ontology. The Sfavorable (marriagefavorable) circumstances for the kind marriage include having a willing partner, exchanging vows administered by an official who signs a license. The institution of marriage itself could change with a change in marriagefavorable circumstances.
The institution of marriage is constituted at t by all those who are married at t. However, just as an army is irreducible to aggregates of soldiers, so too is marriage irreducible to aggregates of married people. Indeed, I reject methodo logical individualism: the institution of marriage is something over and above 12 For example, consider the Sfavorable circumstances for aggregates to constitute the United States, a nationstate. An infant born in the US of parents who are US citizens, is automatically a citizen of the US. When she is born, the aggregate of people who constitute the US citizenry is increased by one. Although she may renounce her citizenship when she grows up, she does not choose to be a citizen of the US in the first place. Another way to complicate matters, there are different UScitizenryfavorable circumstances for naturalized citizens. So, the Sfavorable circumstances that aggregates fulfill to be citizens of the U.S. are disjunctive. the married individuals. We can see this by noting that we can infer very little about the institution of marriage at a given time from the aggregate of individuals who are married at that time. Moreover, the institution confers causal powers on married people -for example, married people can file joint tax returns (in the US); unmarried people cannot.
Marriage is an ID institution: in a world without entities with attitudes, there could be no marriage. Not only must the participants in a marriage ceremony have certain attitudes (e.g. they must believe that they know what they are doing), but also the Sfavorable circumstances for marriage -e.g. getting a qualified person to perform marriages, implementing the apparatus for issuing marriage licenses -require certain attitudes. Intertwining and integrated attitudes form complicated networks for many social institutions.
Suppose that people stopped getting married. Sooner or later there would be no married couples to constitute the institution of marriage. But marriage may neverthe less remain on the books. Would the institution just disappear? I think not -at least not right away. 13 However, the institution of marriage would disappear altogether if the marriagefavorable circumstances could not be satisfied -e.g. if people stopped qualifying to perform marriages, or if the apparatus for issuing marriage licenses was dismantled. In that case, marriage would go the way of primogeniture.
Let me summarize my view of social ontology: Taking "social community" as a primitive, we can characterize a social property as a property the instantia tion of which requires the existence of a social community. Typically, for human beings that means a linguistic community. Social ontology at a time t contains all the instantiated social properties that are irreducible and ineliminable at that time. This will comprise the social properties that are primary kinds that are instantiated at t and the entities (individual or complex) that have those social properties as their primarykind properties.
Someone might mount an ad hominem objection against me. After all, I think that social reality depends on people's attitudes, and I think that that is no bar to social ontology. How can I complain when Searle does the same thing?
13 If marriage remained "on the books" -if the marriagefavorable circumstances were still accepted although no one later fulfilled them -marriage would become an empty institution. Since constitution is timeindexed, there may be a time during which the property of being mar ried would be unexemplified, but still could be exemplified Perhaps the institution of income tax is a better illustration of how an institution can become empty, and then later be revived. Suppose that one year, no on had enough income to have to pay a tax. For that year, the institu tion of incometax would be empty.
When an institution is empty (and has no exemplars of its primarykind property), but the institutionfavorable circumstances remain intact (accepted, "on the books"), it could be revived. In the case of the incometax, when people started having more income, the income taxfavorable circumstances would be satisfied. And there would again be an aggregate of incometaxpayers.
Well, Searle does not do the same thing. There are at least three important differences between Searle and me. First, Searle is a physicalist (Searle says that "we know independently that the world consists entirely of physical particles in fields of force…." (Searle 2006, p. 13; my emphasis) ; I am a pluralist (there are innumerable primary kinds of things). Second, as I mentioned, although I have a minddependent/mindindependent distinction, I do not think that it marks any ontological divide or a basic division in reality. Third, I do not say, as Searle does, that there is a single source of all institutional reality, much less a single logico linguistic operation: a Status Function Declaration (Searle 2010, p. 201 ). On my view, social entities are brought into existence by constitution in Sfavorable circumstances, which may, but need not, include declarations. Some institu tions may just evolve (e.g. cocktail parties). Although Sfavorable circumstances include various intentions, there are numerous different kinds of Sfavorable cir cumstances that make the constitution of different kinds of social realities pos sible. (Compare nationstates with baseball teams: there are different Sfavorable circumstances for each.) Finally, let me note that I agree with Searle that lan guage is required for institutions, and that we create social reality.
The fact that we create the social world does not call for any consternation or special explanation. Why shouldn't we persons -with our abilities, imaginations, and desires -be able to create genuinely new kinds of things? It is just a fact that we can -a fact on a continuum with the fact that beavers build dams. Artefacts are ontologically significant parts of reality that belong in ontology. And human contributions to ontology also include minddependent items like judicial systems, copyrights, and corporations. Since these minddependent items are irreducible and ineliminable at times and hence belong in ontology, there is no need to regard mind dependent items as ontologically inferior to mindindependent items, and hence no consequent need to derive what is minddependent from what is mindindependent.
Conclusion
Ontology, I believe, comprises all the nonredundant and irreducible objects, properties and kinds required to make sense of the world. These include not only the commonsense items, but also the theoretical items, social and otherwise.
Social scientists may think that I have proceeded backward, that we should determine social ontology by starting with socialscience theories and seeing what ontological commitments they make -as we do with natural scientists. Well, natural science differs from social science. The natural sciences are not con strained by the manifest image. However, social theories must accord with our commonsensical view of social phenomena to a significant degree. Social theo ries had better contain properties like living in poverty, being a bureaucracy, and participating in political elections that we all pretheoretically recognize. Since ontology limits reality, ontology matters.
Back to the question with which we started: What difference does it make what is in the ontology and what is not? My answer is probably clear by now: Since ontology pertains to what there really is, anyone interested in what really there is, social scientist or not, ought to care about ontology.
Finally, just what is social ontology? Social ontology, on my view, is that part of a nonredundant inventory of reality that includes social individuals, proper ties and kinds. The relation of constitution, with different social Sfavorable cir cumstances for different social entities, provides a schema for the whole "motley crew" that belong to social ontology.
